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Abstract 
The influence of post-event misinformation on memory is typically constrained by post-
warnings (Blank & Launay, 2014), but little is known about the effectiveness of particular 
features of post-warning, such as their specificity. Experiment 1 compared two levels of post-
warning specificity: A general post-warning just stated the presence of misinformation, 
whereas a specific post-warning identified the test items for which misinformation had been 
presented earlier. The specific post-warning, but not the general post-warning, eliminated 
both the misinformation effect and its deleterious impact on memory monitoring (using a 
classic two-alternative forced-choice recognition procedure). Experiment 2 ruled out an 
alternative interpretation of these findings and replicated this post-warning specificity pattern 
using a cued-recall test. In addition to the moderating influence of task representations on 
misinformation acceptance, we also observed two unexpected facilitative effects on event 
memory caused by misinformation. Misinformation facilitated event memory during 
narrative encoding if discrepancies between the event and the narrative were detected 
(Experiment 1) and during retrieval if a specific post-warning was combined with cued recall 
(Experiment 2). We interpret the facilitative effect of discrepancy detection within Jacoby, 
Wahlheim and Kelley’s (2015) recursive-remindings framework on noticing and recollecting 
change.  
 
Keywords: misinformation; post-warnings; suggestibility; discrepancy detection; recursive 
reminding 
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Public Significance Statement 
We investigated whether warning people after-the-fact about the presence of misinformation 
affected their susceptibility to it. Such research is critical given the amount of misinformation 
people are exposed to in the form of “fake news.” We found that specific warnings that 
highlighted particular questions associated with misinformation were particularly effective at 
helping people overcome misinformation and sometimes such warnings even facilitated their 
memory for the truth.  
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Effects of Post-Warning Specificity on Memory Performance and Monitoring in the 
Eyewitness Misinformation Paradigm 
Many studies on eyewitness memory have shown that misleading information 
encoded after witnessing an event has a deleterious effect on memory reports (e.g., Blank, 
1998; Echterhoff, Hirst, & Hussy, 2005; Higham, 1998; Higham, Luna, & Bloomfield, 2011; 
Lindsay, 1990; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Luna & Migueles, 
2009; Wright, 1993; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994; Zaragoza & Mitchell, 1996; see Loftus, 2005 
for a review). Loftus et al. (1978) introduced a three-stage paradigm for investigating the 
effect of misleading information on memory. As an example of this paradigm, an eyewitness 
might watch a videotape of a burglar stealing a wristwatch (event) and then read a misleading 
narrative summarizing the event in which it is stated, “the burglar stole a wallet” (post-event 
misinformation). A misinformation effect occurs when misled eyewitnesses are more likely 
than non-misled eyewitnesses to indicate on a final memory test for the event that they 
remember seeing a wallet being stolen in the videotape. 
An important issue to address is whether people who mistakenly accept 
misinformation lack confidence in their decision, or whether they fully endorse it. The effect 
of misinformation on confidence is dependent on a number of factors, but several studies 
have suggested the latter. For example, Loftus, Donders, Hoffman, and Schooler (1989) 
found that misinformed participants responded as confidently to incorrect post-event details 
as they did to their memories of event details, leading them to claim that post-event 
misinformation created memories that are “quickly accessed and confidently held” (p. 607; 
see also Luna & Migueles, 2009). Henceforth, we refer to this pattern of impaired accuracy 
coupled with high confidence in endorsements of post-event details as the signature pattern 
of misinformation.  
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Warnings and Misinformation Effects 
Unsurprisingly, memory theorists have investigated whether the effect of 
misinformation is moderated by warnings about the presence of misleading information. 
Previous warnings used in misinformation experiments have certainly been quite diverse, but 
they can be classified into two main groups: pre-warnings and post-warnings. Pre-warnings 
are given prior to the encoding of the post-event misinformation and research has generally 
shown that they are very effective at reducing misinformation effects (e.g., Dodd & 
Bradshaw, 1980; Greene, Flynn, & Loftus, 1982; V. L. Smith & Ellsworth, 1987), most 
likely because participants can attend to and identify the misinformation when it is first 
presented.  
The evidence on post-warnings – typically issued right before the final memory test – 
is more mixed. In a recent meta-analysis, Blank and Launay (2014) established that, on 
average, post-warnings reduced the misinformation effect to less than half of its usual size; 
however, there was considerable variability across studies. In some studies, post-warnings 
completely eliminated misinformation effects (Blank, 1998; Christiaansen & Ochalek, 1983; 
Eakin, Schreiber, & Sergent-Marshall, 2003; Highhouse & Bottrill, 1995; Oeberst & Blank, 
2012; Wright, 1993), whereas in other studies, robust misinformation effects persisted (e.g., 
Belli, Lindsay, Gales, & McCarthy, 1994; Frost, Ingraham, & Wilson, 2002; Greene et al., 
1982; Higham, 1998; Higham et al., 2011; Lindsay, 1990, similar source condition).  
Warning Specificity 
Such variability of post-warning effects is not surprising given the heterogeneity of 
procedures used in different studies. Blank and Launay (2014) classified post-warnings along 
three dimensions, (1) their specificity (in terms of locating the misinformation) and the 
presence or absence of (2) social post-warning (i.e., discrediting the reliability of the source 
of the post-event information) and (3) “enlightenment” (a debriefing-like explanation of the 
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context and purpose of the previous deceptive introduction of misinformation; e.g., Oeberst 
& Blank, 2012). In this article, we draw attention to the specificity dimension, exploring a 
new aspect of post-warning specificity not included in Blank and Launay’s (2014) analysis. 
Specifically, we examine the impact of a particular type of post-warning specificity – item-
specific post-warnings about the presence of misinformation – on measures of memory 
performance and associated metacognition. We believe this type of post-warning to be 
considerably more effective than general post-warnings.  
What do we mean by item-specific post-warnings precisely? In addition to noncritical 
filler questions, a standard memory test used in misinformation studies will typically include 
questions that probe memory for details that have been the target of misinformation 
(henceforth misleading questions) as well as questions probing memory for details not 
associated with misinformation (henceforth control questions). When a general post-warning 
(i.e., about the mere presence of misinformation) is provided along with such a test, 
participants still face uncertainty with respect to (1) how many misleading details had been 
presented and (2) the particular questions in the memory test the post-warning pertains to – 
and this uncertainty could lead to less effective memory search and monitoring strategies (see 
below). By contrast, item-specific post-warnings clearly identify test questions about items 
that had been the target of misinformation. Plainly speaking, item-specific post-warnings 
clearly distinguish “dangerous” (misleading) questions, that is, questions for which more 
elaborate search and monitoring is advisable, from “safe” (control) questions for which such 
caution is not necessarily required.  
There are both theoretical and applied reasons to be interested in the effect of warning 
specificity. On the theoretical side, a long-standing explanation of the misinformation effect 
is “overwriting” or “destructive updating” (e.g., Loftus, 1979a, 1979b; Loftus & Loftus, 
1980; Loftus et al., 1978). On this view, the original event memory is overwritten or 
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destroyed by misinformation. Although the original overwriting hypothesis has largely fallen 
out of favor over the years, largely due to the finding that original event memories are 
sometimes retrievable despite supposed overwriting (e.g., Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; 
McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985), recently it has enjoyed a reappearance in the form of 
reconsolidation-based memory impairment.  Chan and LaPaglia (2013) conducted a series of 
classical, three-stage misinformation experiments (i.e., event, post-event misinformation, 
memory test), except that half the participants were given a cued-recall pretest about the 
event details before receiving the misinformation whereas the other half were not. On a later 
true-false test that followed receipt of misinformation, they found that participants had 
impaired memory for original event details, but only if those memories had been earlier 
reactivated by the cued-recall pretest. They argued that reactivating memories (with the cued-
recall test) produced a reconsolidation window during which the original memory must be 
restabilized. If misinformation is encoded during this window, this reconsolidation process is 
interrupted and can cause the original memory to be overwritten. They argued that their 
results “demonstrate that human declarative memory can be selectively rewritten during 
reconsolidation” (p. 9309; although see Rindal, DeFranco, Rich, & Zaragoza, 2016 for 
counterarguments to this claim).  
If the overwriting hypothesis has any validity, then post-warnings, regardless of 
whether original event memories are reactivated and no matter how specific, should not 
influence retrieval of event details. Simply put, if the warning is given after misinformation 
has been encoded, it will be of no help in retrieving event details no matter how specific the 
warning is because the original event memory has gone. Thus, in terms of event memory, the 
destructive updating hypothesis predicts comparable performance between groups of 
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participants given general vs specific warnings.1  
 On the applied side, post-warning specificity is of particular relevance to the modern 
phenomena of “fake news” and “post-truth politics.” We currently live in an era of rampant 
misinformation. Websites, social media, mainstream news, and even the current White House 
espouse facts and figures that have little to no basis in reality. The sheer prevalence of 
misinformation puts those who are interested in separating facts from fiction in an awkward 
position: What should be believed and what should be taken with a grain of salt? One tool 
that news consumers have available to them is knowledge that only certain topics are likely 
to be falsely reported. For example, news about politics (e.g., Brexit, U.S. election), leaders 
(e.g., Donald Trump, Pope Francis, Hillary Clinton), immigration (e.g., the “Bowling Green 
massacre”)2 or race (e.g., police shootings of Black men; the Black Lives Matter movement) 
might raise a flag and cause people to be cautious. Conversely, information that is less 
sensational (e.g., new scientific discoveries that do not have mass appeal) is more likely to be 
accurate. Thus, the content of news reports can act like a specific warning; the veracity of 
some items of information needs to be questioned whereas other information can be accepted 
at face value.  
Naturally, a similar type of post-warning specificity could occur in forensic settings as 
well. For example, suppose a person witnesses a fight between two people, Greg and 
Joe.  After the altercation, Joe’s friends, who were present at the time, gather around the 
eyewitness and argue that Joe was not to blame – it was all Greg’s fault – but introduce 
                                            
1 Warned participants may adopt certain strategies to limit the effect of misinformation in the absence of event 
memory such as avoiding familiar items on a memory test for fear that they are familiar for the wrong reason. 
However, as the original event memory has been destroyed under the overwriting hypothesis (i.e., only the 
misleading detail resides in memory), these strategies will be of limited value in moderating the effect of 
misinformation across different tests.  
2 The Bowling Green massacre was supposedly a terrorist attack referred to by U.S. Counselor to the President 
Kellyanne Conway in interviews with various media sources in early 2017. Reference to the massacre was 
intended to justify President Trump’s proposed travel and immigration ban that affected travellers from several 
predominantly Muslim countries. However, the massacre never occurred.  
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misinformation in the process. When in court later on, the eyewitness may be vigilant about 
answering questions specifically about Joe’s involvement in the altercation because he is 
aware that Joe’s friends may have influenced him with misinformation.3 Conversely, the 
eyewitness knows that he didn’t receive any misinformation about Greg, so extra vigilance 
answering questions about him is not necessary. Compare this scenario to a second one in 
which an eyewitness receives a general warning prior to giving testimony to be careful about 
answering questions accurately on the stand. In a sense, the eyewitness in the first scenario 
has been post-warned about questions specifically to do with Joe’s involvement in the 
altercation, but not about other types of questions, whereas the warning in the second 
scenario is more general. The question we address in the current research is, compared to a 
general warning, how effective are specific warnings at reducing the effect of misinformation 
on later memory performance.   
Processes Involved in General and Item-Specific Post-Warnings 
How do post-warnings generally affect remembering, and how can specific post-
warnings amplify the beneficial effects on memory performance? Eyewitness testimony 
involves the conversion (Tulving, 1983) of pertinent memory information into a statement, 
such as an answer in a memory test. In principle, conversion includes a very broad range of 
processes, but of particular interest here are memory search as well as monitoring and control 
processes. Eyewitnesses would have to generate candidate answers and monitor their 
likelihood of being accurate (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996), which potentially also involves 
monitoring the sources of candidate answers (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989). Control options 
include the volunteering or withholding of answers (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996), testifying or 
not testifying answers (Higham et al., 2011), regulating the grain size or plurality of answers 
                                            
3 Alternatively, the judge may even caution the eyewitness about answering questions specifically about Joe 
because s/he is aware that Joe’s friends spoke to the eyewitness afterwards. 
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(Goldsmith, Koriat, & Pansky, 2005; Luna, Higham, & Martín-Luengo, 2011; Luna & 
Martín-Luengo, 2012) or – in forced-choice recognition tests – choosing between provided 
responses.  
Crucially, in eyewitness misinformation designs, these processes will differ 
substantially as a function of (1) the presence or absence of post-warnings and (2) the 
specificity of the post-warning. This is because post-warnings shape people’s task 
representation, that is, their understanding of the memory task at hand and the necessary 
strategies to perform well (Blank, 1998; see also Lane, Roussel, Villa, & Morita, 2007, for a 
related approach). Without a post-warning, the task is (deceptively) simple: Drawing on a 
default consistency assumption (Blank, 1998), people will search memory for just one detail 
relevant to a test question, and will accept any familiar detail as the answer – which of course 
may be the misleading detail. Source monitoring is minimal, as the two sources of 
information (the original event and the post-event account) are assumed to be consistent; that 
is, it would be sufficient to place the remembered detail within the general situational context. 
Any post-warning about misinformation will potentially undermine this consistency 
assumption and as a consequence create a different task representation. Endorsing the most 
familiar item or the first item that comes to mind may be no longer sufficient; instead, people 
will need to search for potentially two contradictory details as candidate answers. Moreover, 
source monitoring becomes critical, as the sources of the details now have implications for 
their likely accuracy.  
In short, post-warnings have the potential to change the task representation from a 
simple but problematic one (i.e., search for one familiar detail and report it as the answer: 
search-and-accept), to a complex but enlightened one (i.e., search for two contradictory 
details and monitor their sources to decide about their likely accuracy: search-and-
discriminate). As the latter would help to weed out some inaccurate answers, performance is 
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expected to improve with a post-warning. Existing research supports this analysis. For 
instance, Echterhoff et al. (2005) found increased source monitoring after a post-warning; 
warned participants took longer to make memory decisions and rated their event memories 
higher on memory characteristics (e.g., visual details, vividness, and clarity of spatial context; 
Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988). Further, compared to standard recognition tests, 
source-monitoring tests have been shown to reduce or even eliminate misinformation effects 
(e.g., Lindsay & Johnson, 1989).  
General post-warnings, as argued above, induce a search for potentially two different 
details. What happens, however, if this search is unsuccessful and only one item comes to 
mind (which might be the misleading detail)? In such a case, any subsequent monitoring 
likely depends on what the witness/participant knows or believes regarding the overall 
presence of misinformation in the situation. If they assume the amount of misinformation to 
be small relative to the number of questions asked in the memory test, they may take the 
absence of memory for two contradictory details as evidence that there was no 
misinformation (similar to the impact of subjective theories about the memorability of items; 
Strack & Bless, 1994). As a consequence, they may forego any further source monitoring to 
validate the accuracy of the remembered detail. That is, general post-warnings may produce 
only lax monitoring overall, potentially allowing some misinformation to “slip through the 
net.” 
Consider item-specific post-warnings now, which indicate exactly those questions on 
the memory test for which misinformation had been presented earlier. Such post-warnings 
will optimize the task representation such that witnesses/participants will adopt a search-and-
discriminate approach for misleading items and can safely adopt a search-and-accept 
approach for control items. This, first and foremost, means stricter monitoring and control, 
but it should also have consequences for memory search. When only one detail comes up 
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initially for a designated two-detail question, people may search memory harder for a second 
detail, and in some cases this may be successful. In short, item-specific post-warnings should 
help to reject misleading details and (perhaps to a lesser degree) retrieve original event 
details, hence improving memory performance across the board.  
Finally, note that our analysis of the effects of general and item-specific post-
warnings pointed to parallel expected effects on memory performance and metacognition 
(i.e., both improved memory performance and a reduced signature pattern of overconfidence 
in misinformation). This is because these effects are mediated through respective (less or 
more effective) task representations, which – as we argued above – have consequences for 
both memory and metamemory processes. We tested these ideas in two experiments. 
Experimental Overview 
We present two experiments that investigated the moderating influence of general and 
item-specific post-warnings on the misinformation’s effect on memory performance and 
confidence. In Experiment 1, two groups both received a general post-warning. The general-
warning group received just this post-warning but the specific-warning group received the 
general post-warning as well as item-specific post-warnings that informed participants 
whether each test question was a misleading question or a control question with a clear 
explication of what this meant. Experiment 1 also probed how perceived discrepancies 
between details impacted on memory performance. While Experiment 1 used a standard two-
alternative forced-choice (2AFC) recognition test to assess memory performance, Experiment 
2 employed a cued-recall test to rule out an alternative interpretation of the Experiment 1 
specific-warning group results.  
Experiment 1 
In this experiment, participants studied a series of slides depicting a murder scene. 
Following each slide, participants read a brief narrative about that slide that contained one 
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piece of misinformation. Later, a 2AFC recognition memory test assessed participants’ 
memory for the event details. Crucially, we investigated the effect of two types of post-
warnings. Half of the participants were given just a general post-warning immediately prior 
to the memory test about the presence of misinformation in the narratives. The other half 
received the general post-warning as well as an item-specific post-warning. To implement the 
latter post-warning type, test questions were color-coded according to whether each question 
queried misleading (red) vs control (green) items.  
Experiment 1 also explored the role of discrepancy detection in combination with a 
general post-warning. Several studies have noted that discrepancy detection plays an 
important role in moderating the misinformation effect because it puts participants in a 
position to discount misleading details (e.g., Blank, 1998; Higham 1998; Pohl, Schumacher, 
& Friedrich, 1993; Schooler & Loftus, 1986; Tousignant, Hall, & Loftus, 1986). Our interest 
here, however, was more in determining the outcome if participants failed to detect any 
discrepancy but still received a post-warning. As argued above, lack of subjective evidence of 
the presence of two discrepant details may give participants license to adopt an inadequate 
search-and-accept task representation, rendering a general post-warning ineffective in such 
cases. By contrast, the item-specific post-warning should still ensure an adequate search-and-
discriminate task representation even in cases where no discrepancy was detected, leading to 
better memory performance than in the general-warning group.  
Method 
Participants. A total of 48 students from the University of Southampton participated 
individually in the experiment in exchange for course credits. Ages ranged from 18 to 56 
years (M = 21.65 years, SD = 8.53 years). Twenty-four participants (23 females, 1 male) were 
assigned to the general-warning group and 24 (23 females, 1 male) to the specific-warning 
group.  
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Design and Materials. The “crime scene” consisted of 15 slides (digital photographs) 
and 15 corresponding narratives showing/describing a staged murder. The slides showed the 
perpetrator’s car leaving the crime scene, the victim’s home, a knife, and the victim’s body. 
The narratives contained 30 critical details, two pertaining to each slide in the crime-scene 
sequence. One version of each critical detail (misinformation) misrepresented the detail in the 
slide (e.g., bungalow was mentioned in the narrative when in fact a two-storey house had 
been shown in the slide). The other version (control) either omitted the misinformation or 
described the detail in neutral form (e.g., building). The presence/absence of misinformation 
was varied within-subjects: For any given participant, half the critical details (one per slide) 
occurred in their misleading form and half in their control form, with the assignment of 
critical details to the control vs misleading forms counterbalanced across participants. The 
photographs that made up the slide sequence remained the same and were presented in the 
same order in the two counterbalanced formats. 
A 30-item two-alternative recognition memory test was constructed and made into 
booklets. Each booklet contained a page of instructions followed by five pages containing a 
total of 30 questions. For each question, there were spaces to write an answer (A or B), a 
confidence rating about the accuracy of each response (50% [guess] - 100% [very 
confident]), and a decision about testifying (Y/N).4 Each question on the test queried one 
critical detail and the two choices for each question were the correct event detail (e.g., two-
storey house) and the misleading detail (e.g., bungalow). The questions appeared in 
chronological order, starting with questions about slide 1 and ending with questions about 
slide 15. Across questions, option A vs B represented the correct answer 14 vs 16 times, 
                                            
4 Following Higham et al. (2011), a side issue explored in both of our experiments was the impact of a testify 
option, as a supplementary and ecologically valid index of confidence, on memory performance and confidence. 
The findings largely paralleled the confidence findings and are therefore not reported. 
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respectively. 
Procedure. Participants entered the lab and were seated in front of an Apple 24-inch 
iMac computer, which was used to present the crime-scene slides and narratives using Apple 
Keynote software. The first two slides contained instructions that informed participants that 
they would be shown a series of slides and written descriptions depicting a murder scene. 
They were informed that they should study the slides and descriptions closely. They were 
also told that it was vital that any information they provide in the experiment be accurate and 
informative and to ask any questions before proceeding. Participants then viewed the slides 
one at a time. Eight seconds were allotted to study each slide, after which the screen went 
blank, and then a written narrative appeared which described the details of the slide. The 
narratives corresponding to each slide ranged in length depending on the amount of detail 
depicted. Longer display times were implemented for longer narratives so that all participants 
could finish reading them (range: 15-25 seconds).  
 After the slide show and narratives had been presented, participants were given a 
Sudoku puzzle to complete for 10 minutes as a distractor task. They were then administered a 
test booklet containing a set of instructions on the first page (which included a post-warning – 
see below) and the questions for the recognition memory test on subsequent pages. While 
answering questions on the test, participants were asked to imagine that they were in a 
courtroom. They were instructed to answer all questions. A 50-100% confidence rating was 
also required.5 After finishing the test, all participants were asked, “Did you notice any 
discrepancies between the pictures presented and the slide narratives?” If participants 
indicated “yes” to this question, they were asked to “…go back over the questionnaire and 
                                            
5 As participants manually entered their confidence ratings on a blank space, they were free to ignore 
instructions and provide confidence ratings lower than 50%. This happened infrequently, though; 3% of the 
ratings in Experiment 1 (6% in the general-warning group and 0% in the specific-warning group) were in this 
range. (Experiment 2 used a 0-100% confidence rating instruction.) 
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put a tick in the right hand margin corresponding to the questions that you recognized as 
having such a discrepancy.”6  
Post-warnings. Participants in both the general-warning and specific-warning groups 
were post-warned about the presence of misinformation in the narratives. In particular, the 
following instructions were printed on the first page of the memory test booklet, which 
participants read immediately prior to completing the memory test: 
IMPORTANT: The narratives that you read earlier contained some inaccurate 
details. Don’t assume that if you can remember a detail from the narrative, that it is 
guaranteed to be correct. To perform well on the test, you need to accurately 
remember what happened on the slides, which may or may not correspond to the 
account in the narratives. 
In addition to this general post-warning, participants in the specific-warning group 
were informed on an item-by-item basis which 15 test questions pertained to details for which 
there was misinformation presented earlier (misleading questions) and which 15 questions 
did not (control questions). This was achieved by printing the former question type in red 
typeface and the latter question type in green typeface and informing participants about the 
association between color and question type in the instructions given just prior to the memory 
test. Specifically, the following directions were printed on the first page of the memory-test 
booklet that contained the rest of the instructions: 
                                            
6 Discrepancies may have been detected during narrative encoding and/or later when the two discrepant details 
were explicitly presented to participants on the 2AFC recognition test. In contrast to our methodology that 
required participants to identify discrepancies at test, research on noticing and recollecting change, discussed in 
more detail later in this article, has typically required participants to identify discrepancies as they are first 
presented (e.g., Jacoby, Wahlheim, & Kelley, 2015). Requiring participants to identify discrepancies as soon as 
they are presented rather than later during testing means that no detected discrepancies are forgotten. However, 
it was not possible to follow this procedure in our design because alerting participants to the presence of 
discrepancies prior to narrative encoding would have constituted a pre-warning rather than a post-warning. 
Thus, although we admit that our procedure may have missed some discrepancy detection (e.g., some 
discrepancies detected during narrative encoding may have been forgotten by the time the test was written), as 
will become apparent, discrepancy-detection decisions made during the test were still very informative about the 
underlying processes.  
GENERAL AND SPECIFIC POST-WARNINGS      17 
 
PLEASE NOTE: There are 30 questions in total, each with two alternative answers. 
Fifteen of these questions relate to details about which you have been misinformed. In 
other words, a narrative that you read contained misleading information about that 
detail, so you have to be very careful when answering these questions. For these 
questions, one alternative is correct (i.e., it appeared only in the slides) whereas the 
other is incorrect (i.e., it was read about only in the narrative). The other 15 
questions relate to details about which you have received no misinformation. In other 
words, the narrative did not contain misleading information about that detail. For 
these questions, one alternative is correct (i.e., it appeared only in the slides) whereas 
the other is incorrect (i.e., it is a new detail). To help you answer the questions 
correctly and make decisions about which answers to use in your testimony, 
misinformation questions are written in RED, whereas non-misleading questions are 
written in GREEN. 
 Test questions all appeared in black (consistent with the rest of the questionnaire) for 
participants in the general-warning group.  
Results and Discussion 
 Some analyses required excluding a few participants because of empty or undefined 
cells. For example, if accuracy for a particular participant was 100%, then it was not possible 
to compute mean confidence for incorrect answers. Because many of our analyses were 
repeated-measures, the number of participants contributing data to different analyses varied 
(e.g., fewer participants were likely to contribute data to all cells in larger analyses involving 
many conditions compared to smaller analyses involving only a few conditions). The number 
of missing cases for each analysis is indicated in footnotes throughout the Results and 
Discussion sections. For the tables, the means and standard errors are based on all available 
data for each cell and may vary slightly from the means yielded from analyses for which 
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participants were excluded. 
We first conducted analyses on all responses followed by further analyses that 
separated items according to whether a discrepancy was or was not detected.  
Memory performance. Mean accuracy is shown in Table 1. A 2 (question type: 
misleading, control) × 2 (group: specific-warning, general-warning) mixed Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) on accuracy revealed a significant effect of question type, F(1,46) = 
15.42, MSE = 0.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .25 which was qualified by a question type by group 
interaction, F(1,46) = 6.60, MSE = 0.02, p = .013, ηp2 = .13. Accuracy was higher for control 
items (M = .76, SEM = .02) than misleading items (M = .65, SEM = .03), but as shown in 
Table 1, this difference only existed in the general-warning group, F(1,23) = 25.31, MSE = 
0.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .52. The misinformation effect was eliminated when specific post-
warnings were made available, F < 1. The main effect of group was not significant, F(1,46) = 
2.29, MSE = 0.03, p = .14, ηp2 = .05. 
Confidence. Mean confidence is shown in Table 2. The data were initially analyzed 
with a 2 (question type: misleading, control) × 2 (group: specific-warning, general-warning) 
× 2 (accuracy: correct, incorrect) mixed ANOVA, with group as the only between-subjects 
factor.7 It revealed main effects of question type, F(1,42) = 5.07, MSE = 76.41, p = .03, ηp2 = 
.11, and accuracy, F(1,42) = 101.98, MSE = 133.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .71, as well as a two-way 
interaction between question type and group, F(1,42) = 9.15, MSE = 76.41, p = .004, ηp2 = 
.18. There was also a marginal two-way interaction between question type and accuracy, 
F(1,42) = 4.05, MSE = 65.49, p = .05, ηp2 = .09. However, all these effects were qualified by 
a significant three-way interaction between question type, accuracy, and group, F(1,42) = 
9.07, MSE = 65.49, p = .004, ηp2 = .18. 
                                            
7 Four participants (one in the general-warning group and three in the specific-warning group) were dropped 
from this analysis because they made no errors in one of the cells. 
GENERAL AND SPECIFIC POST-WARNINGS      19 
 
To interpret the three-way interaction, we ran separate 2 (question type: misleading, 
control) × 2 (accuracy: correct, incorrect) repeated-measures ANOVAs on mean confidence 
in each group. The general-warning group ANOVA revealed main effects of question type, 
F(1,22) = 13.19, MSE = 84.53, p = .001, ηp2 = .38, and accuracy, F(1,22) = 44.05, MSE = 
183.77, p < .001, ηp2 = .67. Confidence was higher for misleading items (M = 74, SEM = 2) 
than control items (M = 67, SEM = 3) and it was higher for correct responses (M = 80, SEM = 
2) than incorrect responses (M = 61, SEM = 3). More interesting, there was a significant 
interaction between question type and accuracy, F(1,22) = 13.64, MSE = 63.46, p = .001, ηp2 
= .38. The interaction occurred because misinformation boosted confidence in incorrect 
responses, F(1,22) = 16.30, MSE = 121.04, p = .001, ηp2 = .43, whereas it had no effect on 
correct responses, F < 1. Thus, the signature pattern of misinformation was observed in the 
general-warning group. 
By contrast, there was no such interaction in the second 2 × 2 repeated-measures 
ANOVA on mean confidence in the specific-warning group, F < 1, only a main effect of 
accuracy, F(1,20) = 72.35, MSE = 79.18, p < 001, ηp2 = .78. As with the previous analysis, 
correct responses (M = 83, SEM = 1) were assigned higher confidence than incorrect 
responses (M = 67, SEM = 2). This result, coupled with the fact that no misinformation effect 
was obtained on accuracy in the specific-warning group, indicates specific warnings 
eliminated the signature pattern of misinformation.8  
                                            
8 One could argue that specific warnings did not reduce confidence in wrong responses to misleading items 
(general-warning: M = 65, SEM = 3; specific-warning: M = 67, SEM = 3). Instead, it increased confidence in 
wrong control judgments (general-warning: M = 54, SEM = 4; specific-warning: M = 68, SEM = 3). However, in 
our view, some caution should be exerted in interpreting absolute confidence means in this way (rather than 
relative patterns) because it fails to take into account response bias (see Higham, Zawadzka, & Hanczakowski, 
2016, for detailed discussion). It is likely that the specific warning caused confidence assignments to become 
more relaxed compared to the general warning, which would have increased both the control and misleading 
confidence means. If this difference in response bias is coupled with a genuine decrease in subjective confidence 
for wrong responses to misleading items in the specific-warning group, the result could be confidence means for 
misleading items that are approximately equal between the groups and control means that are different (just as 
we observed: see Table 2).  
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Discrepancy detection and post-warning effectiveness. Recall that at the end of the 
memory test, participants were required to mark any test questions that corresponded to a 
noticed discrepancy between the narratives and the slides. We used these data to further 
explore the effectiveness of general and item-specific post-warnings. As argued in the 
introduction, general post-warnings are ambiguous in that they leave it to the participants to 
decide which questions on the test the post-warning applies to and the task representation that 
would be adequate. If people failed to detect a discrepancy for a given test question, they 
should be more inclined to just search for one detail and accept it, possibly falsely (if it is a 
misleading detail). By contrast, detecting a discrepancy between the detail in the event and 
the one in the narrative should trigger a search-and-discriminate task representation and make 
people more resistant to misinformation by, for example, invoking more careful source 
monitoring. Thus, the task representation that is adopted for a particular test question in the 
general-warning group may depend to a large extent on discrepancy detection.  
This logic does not apply to item-specific post-warnings, however, because, by their 
very nature, specific post-warnings already provide adequate task representations for both 
misleading and control questions, such that participants need not rely on the presence or 
absence of discrepancy detection to (mis-)specify them. In short, particularly the absence of 
discrepancy detection for misleading items should carry the risk of task misspecification and 
subsequent performance and monitoring deficits in the presence of general but not item-
specific post-warnings. It is worth noting, though, that accuracy could still be poor for 
misleading items if a discrepancy was missed, even in the specific-warning group. For 
example, if the misleading detail was the only one recognized and this detail was 
misattributed to the event, then errors would result. However, we do not anticipate the effect 
of discrepancy detection in the specific-warning group to be as large as that observed in the 
general-warning group. 
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Hence, our analysis strategy was to focus on memory performance and monitoring for 
these no discrepancy detected (NDD) cases and to contrast them with cases where a 
discrepancy had been detected (discrepancy detected or DD cases; see Table 1). Overall, the 
vast majority of participants responded affirmatively to the Y/N question about whether any 
discrepancies were detected (general warning: 92%; specific warning: 88%). At the item 
level, the incidence of correct discrepancy detection (i.e., for misleading questions) was 38% 
in both the general- and specific-warning groups (both SEMs = 4). The false discrepancy 
detection rate (i.e., for control questions) was too low to statistically analyze (10% and 1% in 
the general- and specific-warning groups, respectively). Therefore, our subsequent re-
analyses focused exclusively on misleading questions.9  
In the general-warning group, responses to NDD misleading questions were 
substantially less accurate than responses to DD misleading questions (Table 1). Indeed, 
mean NDD accuracy was below chance, +95% confidence limit = .49, indicating that 
participants not only had their accuracy impaired by misinformation if a discrepancy was not 
detected, but they preferred the misleading detail over the event detail. By comparison, DD 
accuracy was very high – even higher than control accuracy, a point to which we return 
below. The same general pattern of better DD than NDD accuracy was present in the 
specific-warning group as well, even though participants knew the appropriate task 
representation. We attribute this residual difference in accuracy to source-monitoring failures. 
However, the drop in NDD accuracy compared to DD accuracy in the specific-warning group 
was not as great as in the general-warning group. Indeed, NDD accuracy differed between the 
groups, F(1,46) = 9.02, MSE = 0.05, p = .004, ηp2 = .16. In short, failing to detect a 
discrepancy made people vulnerable to misinformation even in the presence of a specific 
                                            
9 All participants were included in these analyses. For those participants who indicated on the overall Y/N 
question that they failed to detect any discrepancies, all their test questions were coded as NDD. 
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post-warning, but the vulnerability was much worse if only a general post-warning was 
provided.  
In contrast to the poor performance for misleading NDD items, accuracy for 
misleading DD items was near ceiling (Table 1) and higher than control accuracy. This 
observation was confirmed statistically: accuracy for misleading DD items exceeded control 
accuracy in both the general and specific warning groups, F(1,21) = 7.51, MSE = 0.02, p = 
.012, ηp2 = .26 and F(1,20) = 31.10, MSE = 0.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .61, respectively.10 This 
finding is potentially interesting given recent research demonstrating that if participants 
notice and recollect change in classical retroactive (and proactive) interference paradigms, 
facilitation may be observed instead of interference (e.g., Jacoby et al., 2015; Jacoby, 
Wahlheim, & Yonelinas, 2013; Putnam, Wahlheim, & Jacoby, 2014; Wahlheim, 2014, 2015).  
However, before elaborating further on either this facilitation for misleading DD 
items or the impairment for misleading NDD items, we considered it necessary to eliminate 
the possibility of item-selection artifacts. For example, it is quite plausible that NDD vs DD 
items are ones for which event memory is poor vs good, respectively, and it is this variation 
in event memory that is the reason for the accuracy difference between the item types, not the 
variation in the rate of discrepancy detection per se. Indeed, a correlational analysis showed 
that control performance – as an uncompromised (by misinformation) measure of memory 
strength for original details – was correlated with discrepancy detection across the 30 test 
items; r = .45 and r = .49 in the general- and specific-warning groups, respectively (both 
significantly above zero, p < .05).  
To investigate this possibility, we followed others in the change-recollection literature 
(e.g., Jacoby et al., 2015; Putnam, Sungkhasettee, & Roediger, 2017; Putnam et al., 2014) and 
                                            
10 Five participants (two vs three in the general- vs specific-warning groups, respectively) were excluded from 
these analyses because they indicated that they had detected no discrepancies.  
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conducted a hierarchical regression analysis at the level of items. In this model, accuracy for 
misleading items was the dependent variable, whereas the predictors were (a) accuracy for 
control items (as a measure of item memory), (b) the difference in the discrepancy detection 
rate between misleading and control items (the difference taken to control for guessing), and 
(c) the interaction between these two variables. Control item accuracy was entered first, 
followed by the discrepancy detection rate, and then the interaction. If the difference in 
accuracy for DD vs NDD items was entirely due to differential event memory, then the 
discrepancy detection variable would not account for any additional variance once the 
control-item accuracy was entered on the first step. However, if discrepancy detection per se 
had an effect on performance above and beyond variations in event memory, then 
discrepancy detection would account for some additional unique variance. Because the data 
patterns were similar between the groups (i.e., NDD < control < DD, with similar rates of 
correct discrepancy detection), we pooled them to increase power. 
The regression analysis indicated that the total amount of variance explained by the 
three predictors was R2 = .63. As expected, control-item accuracy entered on step 1 was a 
significant predictor of misleading-item accuracy, ∆R2 = .52, p < .001. More critically, 
discrepancy detection entered on step 2 also accounted for a significant amount of additional 
unique variance, ∆R2 = .11, p = .009. Finally, the amount of variance accounted for by the 
interaction between these variable entered on step 3 was not significant, ∆R2 = .00, p = .90. 
Thus, the regression analysis indicates that although item selection played a role in producing 
facilitation for DD items and impairment for NDD items, it by no means accounted for the 
full effect; detecting discrepancies also had a unique effect on performance. 
A critic might argue that the association between discrepancy detection and memory 
performance for misleading items in this analysis may not be due to discrepancy detection 
causing better event memory, but rather it reflects the reverse causal relationship. On this 
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view, there may be fluctuations in attention that vary on a participant-by-participant basis. 
For example, a random attentional lapse for one participant could interrupt his/her ability to 
encoding the details of a slide even though that slide resulted in excellent item memory for 
most other participants. Conversely, another participant might idiosyncratically focus on an 
item that is missed by most other people. Under most circumstances, such attentional 
fluctuations would simply be considered statistical noise.  However, in the present context, 
idiosyncratic fluctuations may be problematic in that they may independently affect 
discrepancy detection and later performance on the memory test for that participant. 
Ultimately, the critic argues, there is only one causal variable, item memory, which takes two 
forms in our regression analysis: a stable, item-based component which is captured by 
average control accuracy, and an idiosyncratic one which is captured by the discrepancy-
detection variable. Critically, by this account, discrepancy detection per se has no causal 
influence on item memory or performance on the memory test, a conclusion that is 
completely at odds with our interpretation of the regression results.   
Although our data do not permit us to eliminate this account absolutely, we do not 
believe that random attentional fluctuations occurred often enough to fully account for the 
added effect of discrepancy detection in our regression analysis. First, control accuracy was 
highly correlated across items between the two warning conditions, r = .74, p < .001.  As 
noted above, idiosyncratic attentional fluctuations would introduce statistical noise into the 
estimates of control accuracy. If these fluctuations occurred with any regularity, statistical 
noise would be high, resulting in a low correlation between these variables. Instead, the fact 
that this correlation was high, despite the different procedures implemented between the 
groups, suggests that any attentional fluctuations were few and far between. Second, as we 
discuss in more detail below, a growing body of research across different paradigms, 
including the misinformation paradigm (e.g., Putnam et al., 2016), has indicated that covert 
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retrieval of original memories during discrepancy detection can have a facilitative effect 
(Jacoby et al., 2013, 2015; Putnam et al., 2014; Wahlheim, 2014, 2015). Hence, we believe it 
would be imprudent to attribute the added effect of discrepancy detection in our hierarchical 
regression analysis entirely to random attentional fluctuations. Nonetheless, future research 
investigating the causal role of discrepancy detection in the misinformation paradigm might 
implement different procedures to more firmly establish causality (e.g., experimentally 
manipulate the likelihood of discrepancy detection for the same set of items). 
Our final analysis was to investigate the relationship between discrepancy detection 
and confidence.11 Inspection of Table 2 reveals a complementary picture to accuracy in terms 
of confidence for correct and incorrect NDD answers. In the general-warning group, the 
signature misinformation pattern was preserved for incorrect NDD answers; that is, there was 
higher confidence assigned to incorrect answers to misleading NDD questions compared to 
control questions, F(1,22) = 18.02, MSE = 127.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .45. By contrast, the 
absence of this pattern was replicated (with respect to the analysis on all responses) in the 
specific-warning group, F(1,20) = 1.03, MSE = 118.53, p = .32, ηp2 = .05. Further, in the 
general-warning group, there was a complete breakdown of discrimination between correct 
and incorrect misleading NDD answers, F < 1, but not in the specific-warning group, F(1,21) 
= 33.56, MSE = 30.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .62. That is, the item-specific post-warning not only 
improved memory performance but also memory monitoring, compared to the general post-
warning. 
Summary and interpretation. In the general-warning group, we found a 
misinformation effect on accuracy, accompanied by a boost to confidence for incorrect 
responses – the signature pattern of misinformation. Thus, similar to several other reports 
                                            
11 Between one and three participants were dropped in each analysis because of empty cells. DD answers were 
not included in this analysis because there were too few incorrect DD answers to make this meaningful. 
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(e.g., Belli et al., 1994; Greene et al., 1982; Higham, 1998; Higham et al., 2011; Zaragoza & 
Lane, 1994), an influence of misinformation was still evident despite participants’ general 
awareness of its presence. In contrast, performance in the specific-warning group was much 
better – the item-specific post-warning completely eliminated both the misinformation effect 
on accuracy and the effect on confidence. Essentially, once participants knew which 
questions were which, there was no discernable effect of misinformation at all.  
However, these beneficial effects of specific post-warnings were less pronounced if 
participants failed to detect a discrepancy between the detail in the event and the detail in the 
narrative. Under those circumstances, a robust misinformation effect was observed, even after 
controlling for item-selection artifacts, an effect we attribute to problems monitoring the 
source of misleading details that were retrieved without a corresponding event detail. 
Although these source-monitoring problems likely occurred in the general-warning group as 
well, they were exacerbated by an inappropriate task representation. Participants provided 
only with a general post-warning and who recognized only one detail in response to a test 
question likely came to believe that they were answering a control question and continued 
search efforts were unnecessary. As a result, they endorsed the misleading details frequently 
and with high confidence.  
Finally, an unexpected finding was that retrieval of event details was facilitated by 
misinformation if a discrepancy was detected. Again, this effect persisted even after 
controlling for item-selection artifacts. Retroactive facilitation has recently been shown to 
occur in the classical retroactive interference paradigm (as well as the proactive interference 
paradigm; e.g., Jacoby et al., 2015) and Putnam et al. (2017) have recently demonstrated 
retroactive facilitation in a misinformation paradigm. We believe this finding is important at 
both a theoretical and applied level and so we return to it again in the General Discussion. 
Experiment 2 
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The purpose of Experiment 2 was to address two issues related to the use of a 2AFC 
recognition test in Experiment 1. First, there is a possible alternative interpretation of the 
observed efficacy of item-specific post-warnings: As a simple shortcut for generating 
answers to test questions, participants could have decided, for some of the misleading 
questions, to just switch their answers from their initially preferred response to the other one. 
That is, upon learning (through the specific post-warning) that there might be a problem with 
the detail they remembered, they simply opted for the other alternative in some cases. If what 
they initially remembered was the misleading detail, this would have resulted in an apparent 
but not genuine improvement of memory accuracy in the specific-warning group.  
Second, it has long been known that recognition, by virtue of being supported by the 
most efficient retrieval cue – the item itself – is not as vulnerable to retroactive interference 
(from post-event misinformation, for instance) as recall (e.g., Postman & Stark, 1969). 
Hence, even if there was a genuine improvement in recognition accuracy, item-specific post-
warnings may prove less efficient in less supported (in terms of retrieval cues), but perhaps 
more ecologically valid, retrieval situations. To address these issues, Experiment 2 used a 
cued-recall procedure.  
Method 
Participants. A total of 44 students from the University of Southampton participated 
individually in the experiment in exchange for course credits. Ages ranged from 18 to 33 
years (M = 22.84 years, SD = 3.49 years). Twenty-two participants (15 females, 7 males) 
were assigned to the general-warning group and 22 (11 females, 11 males) to the specific-
warning group. 
Design, materials and procedure. The design, materials and procedure in 
Experiment 2 were mostly the same as in Experiment 1 except that (1) participants received a 
cued-recall test after the post-warning, (2) confidence ratings were made on a 0-100% rather 
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than a 50-100% scale, and (3) no discrepancy-detection decisions were gathered at the end of 
the experiment.12 For the cued-recall task, instead of choosing between two response 
alternatives for each test question, a space was provided for participants to write their answer. 
Confidence ratings and testify decisions were collected as before. Participants were explicitly 
instructed to guess if they did not know the answer to a question; this instruction was used to 
avoid losing too many responses for the confidence and monitoring analyses.  
The general post-warning was the same as in Experiment 1. However, to 
accommodate the cued-recall task, the specific post-warning had to be amended slightly as 
follows:  
PLEASE NOTE: There are 30 questions in total. Fifteen of these questions relate to 
details about which you have been misinformed. In other words, a narrative that you 
read contained misleading information about that detail, so you have to be very 
careful when answering these questions. The other 15 questions relate to details about 
which you have received no misinformation. In other words, the narrative did not 
contain misleading information about that detail. To help you answer the questions 
correctly and make decisions about which answers to use in your testimony, 
misinformation questions are written in RED, whereas non-misleading questions are 
written in GREEN. 
 Coding of recall answers. Cued-recall responses were coded into five categories: (1) 
critical-event detail (corresponding to the correct response alternative in the 2AFC test used 
                                            
12 Discrepancy-detection decisions were not implemented in this experiment because we used cued-recall testing 
rather than 2AFC recognition as in Experiment 1. For 2AFC recognition, it is clear which details were to be 
judged for discrepancies because they were presented to participants as recognition alternatives. For example, 
one test question was “In photograph 1, what was at the end of the road?” and participants chose between “two-
storey building” (event detail) and “bungalow” (misleading detail). However, neither of these responses was 
necessarily made on the cued-recall test. For example, a legitimate response would have been “house” (counted 
as noncritical-correct detail; see section on coding). Because the details to be assessed for discrepancies were 
not well specified in cued recall, the discrepancy detection data would have been difficult or even impossible to 
interpret. 
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in Experiment 1), (2) noncritical-event detail (i.e., an event detail that was technically correct, 
but which was not specifically the critical-event detail), (3) critical-misleading detail 
(corresponding to the misleading 2AFC response alternative), (4) noncritical-incorrect detail 
(any incorrect detail other than the critical-misleading detail), and (5) unclassifiable response. 
For example, in response to the cue “In photograph 1, what was at the end of the road?” the 
responses “two-storey building,” “house,” bungalow,” “a cat,” and “dunno” would constitute 
categories 1-5, respectively. After pooling the data from the general- and specific-warning 
groups, categories 1-5 accounted for 41%, 19%, 14%, 21% and 5% of all answers provided, 
respectively. Our analyses below focus primarily on categories 1 and 3.  
Results and Discussion 
Memory performance. Table 3 shows the mean proportion of control and misleading 
questions with critical-event details and critical-misleading details as responses in the cued-
recall task. The former details counted as one type of correct response whereas the latter 
counted as one type of error. A 2 (question type: control, misleading) × 2 (group: specific-
warning, general-warning) mixed ANOVA on the proportion of critical-event details recalled 
yielded no significant main effects, largest F(1,42) = 2.37, MSE = 0.01 ηp2 = .05, but there 
was a significant interaction, F(1,42) = 4.51, MSE = 0.01, p = .040, ηp2 = .10. Follow-up tests 
on the interaction revealed little difference in the proportions of correctly recalled critical-
event details for control and misleading questions in the general-warning group, F < 1, 
whereas in the specific-warning group, the proportion was greater for misleading questions 
than control questions, F(1,21) = 6.05, MSE = 0.01, p = .023, ηp2 = .22 (Table 3).  
The analogous 2 × 2 ANOVA on the proportion of critical-misleading details falsely 
recalled found significant main effects of question type, F(1,42) = 29.36, MSE = 0.01, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .41, and group, F(1,42) = 10.15, MSE = 0.01, p = .003, ηp2 = .20. False recall was 
higher for misleading questions (M = .19, SEM = .02) than control questions (M = .09, SEM = 
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.01) and it was higher in the general-warning group (M = .17, SEM = .01) than in the specific-
warning group (M = .11, SEM = .01). However, both these main effect were qualified by a 
significant interaction, F(1,42) = 11.40, p = .002, MSE = 1.84, ηp2 = .21. Follow-up tests on 
the interaction indicated a large misinformation effect in the general-warning group, F(1,21) 
= 37.68, MSE = 0.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .64, but no comparable effect in the specific-warning 
group, F(1,21) = 2.14, MSE = 0.01, p = .158, ηp2 = .09 (Table 3).  
Confidence. Participants’ mean confidence in correctly recalled critical-event details 
and falsely recalled critical-misleading details in the general- and specific-warning groups is 
shown in Table 4. As in Experiment 1, mean confidence was analyzed with a 2 (question 
type: control vs. misleading) × 2 (response: correct vs. incorrect) × 2 (group: general-
warning, specific-warning) mixed ANOVA with group as the only between-subjects factor.13  
It revealed only a main effect of response, F(1,30) = 55.81, MSE = 437.01, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.65. Unsurprisingly, correct responses (M = 86, SEM = 2) were assigned higher confidence 
than incorrect responses (M = 59, SEM = 4). No other main effects or interactions were 
significant, all Fs < 1. The signature pattern of misinformation – greater confidence in 
incorrect responses for misleading as opposed to control questions – was still descriptively 
present in the general-warning group, but it did not reach significance, F < 1. Also, 
confidence in incorrect responses to misleading questions was descriptively higher in the 
general-warning group than in the specific-warning group, but again not significantly so, 
F(1,39) = 2.00, MSE = 708.48, p = .165, ηp2 = .05.14  
Additional analyses. We conducted Experiment 2 primarily to eliminate the 
possibility that a response-switching strategy was the cause of specific warnings having such 
                                            
13 Twelve participants (five vs seven in the general- vs specific-warning groups respectively) were dropped from 
this analysis due to empty cells. 
14 For these last two analyses, ten participants were dropped from the first (five from each group) and three 
participants were dropped from the second (all in the specific-warning group) because of empty cells. 
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a profound effect on memory performance in Experiment 1. Compared to the 2AFC 
recognition task used in Experiment 1, for which two candidate answers were explicitly 
presented for every question, no candidate answers were explicitly presented in the cued-
recall task used in Experiment 2. Consequently, it was not as straightforward for participants 
to switch away from the more familiar (narrative) detail to a less familiar (slide) detail when 
specifically warned about the presence of misinformation and improving memory accuracy as 
a result. 
However, the critic could argue that, although it is not as straightforward, response 
switching could still potentially occur in cued recall as well. Participants may, for example, 
covertly retrieve both the more familiar misleading detail along with the less familiar event 
detail in response to the question. If participants are specifically warned that a particular 
question is dangerous but they are unsure about the source of each candidate response, they 
may strategically elect to report the less familiar event detail, which would lead to better 
recall performance. This criticism is important to reject because it potentially could explain 
both the enhanced recall of event details, and the lower rate of falsely recalling misleading 
details, for misleading questions compared to control questions in the specific-warning 
group.15 
To address this criticism, we conducted two analyses. The first was an item analysis 
for which we correlated two variables in the specific-warning group. The first variable was 
the amount of recall facilitation for critical-event details that each question yielded in its 
misleading form compared to its control form (i.e., misleading recall proportion minus 
control recall proportion for each question). The second variable was the number of different 
                                            
15 Although the goal of strategic response switching in cued recall is similar to that in the 2AFC task, there is an 
important difference. In 2AFC, the event detail may not be retrieved and have no familiarity at all; however, 
participants may still select it simply to avoid the familiar (narrative) detail. In contrast, the event detail in cued 
recall must be retrieved for participants to be able to switch to it. In other words, response switching requires 
retrieval of the event detail in some form to operate in cued recall, whereas it does not in 2AFC. 
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candidate responses that were produced for each question across participants (set size). We 
reasoned that any given participant would be more likely to be entertaining several candidate 
responses for questions with large vs small set sizes. Furthermore, response switching was 
likely to produce greater facilitation for questions with small set sizes rather than large ones 
because there would be fewer competitors to interfere with reporting the event detail once the 
misleading detail was discounted. In other words, response switching predicts a negative 
relationship between these variables (greater set size, less facilitation). However, contrary to 
this prediction, the results of this analysis revealed a positive correlation between the 
variables, r = .45, p = .013. 
Our second analysis focused on recall of the noncritical-event details in the specific-
warning group. As noted above, participants sometimes produced details on the recall test 
that were technically correct because they were shown in the slides, but they were not 
critical-event details (e.g., recalling “house” instead of the critical-event detail “two-storey 
building”). If response switching was the cause of excellent performance in the specific-
warning group, then recall of noncritical-event details for misleading questions should be 
augmented relative to control questions, just as it was for the critical-event details. However, 
this was not the case; recall of noncritical-event details to misleading questions (M = .15, 
SEM = .02) was impaired relative to control questions (M = .25, SEM = .02), F(1,21) = 9.49, 
MSE = 0.012, p = .006, ηp2 = .31. Thus, specific warnings did not just facilitate reporting of 
any correct information – the enhancement was specific to critical-event information. 
Coupled with the results of the previous analysis, this analysis allowed us to safely eliminate 
response switching as the basis of our results. 
Summary and interpretation. Similar to Experiment 1, we found higher levels of 
misinformation endorsement with general as opposed to item-specific post-warnings in 
Experiment 2. Indeed, specific post-warnings completely eliminated the misinformation 
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effect even though the retrieval cues were less efficient (i.e., cued recall instead of 2AFC 
recognition). Moreover, strategic response switching was not the cause of this excellent 
memory performance in the specific-warning group. First, response switching was made 
more difficult by using a cued-recall task in Experiment 2. Second, subsequent analyses 
eliminated the possibility that participants overcame this difficulty by strategically reporting 
less familiar covertly-generated candidate responses.  
An additional unanticipated effect of specific post-warnings in Experiment 2 was that 
correct recall of critical-event details was greater for misleading questions than control 
questions, a pattern that did not occur with a general post-warning (Table 3). We return to 
this surprising finding in the General Discussion. Finally, Experiment 2 replicated the 
beneficial effect of item-specific post-warnings on confidence: the signature misinformation 
pattern was eliminated, whereas it was still at least descriptively present in the general-
warning group.  
General Discussion 
The purpose of this research was to investigate the impact of post-warning specificity 
on memory performance and monitoring in the eyewitness misinformation paradigm. We 
conducted two experiments, the first using a standard 2AFC recognition procedure and the 
second using cued recall. Similar to several previous studies (e.g., Belli et al., 1994; Frost et 
al., 2002; Greene et al., 1982; Higham, 1998; Higham et al., 2011), the general post-warning 
administered in Experiment 1 was not very effective at reducing the effect of misinformation 
on either accuracy or confidence. Instead, the signature pattern of misinformation observed in 
other research (e.g., Loftus et al., 1989; Luna & Migueles, 2009) was preserved in the 
general-warning group: reduced memory accuracy and inappropriately high confidence when 
misinformation was erroneously accepted.  
By contrast, the item-specific post-warning completely eliminated both the 
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misinformation effect on accuracy and the exaggerated confidence in endorsed 
misinformation. Experiment 2 further established that the effect of item-specific post-
warnings is not limited to peculiarities of 2AFC recognition procedures – which could invite 
simple heuristics such as switching responses for dangerous questions – but extends to a 
cued-recall setting where such heuristics are of less use. In the remainder of this discussion, 
we will address a number of particularly noteworthy findings before drawing some general 
conclusions. 
Discrepancy Detection and Misleading Details 
Why was the general post-warning administered in Experiment 1 not very effective at 
reducing the misinformation effect? That is, what differentiates our study from some other 
studies that did find full elimination of the misinformation effect using general post-warnings 
(e.g., Christiaansen & Ochalek, 1983; Highhouse & Bottrill, 1995; Oeberst & Blank, 2012)? 
It is clear from our experiments that failure to detect discrepancies was at the heart of the 
problem in the general-warning group in Experiment 1; accuracy for misleading NDD 
questions, for which no discrepancy was detected, was half that of control questions and 
significantly below chance. This large misinformation effect for misleading NDD items was 
preserved even after controlling for item-selection artifacts. These data suggest that the 
signature pattern of misinformation found in the complete data set described above was 
primarily driven by extremely poor performance (coupled with inappropriately high 
confidence) on misleading questions for which discrepancy detection failed.  
Performance for misleading details in both the general- and specific-warning groups 
is depicted in Figure 1. (Ignore the information associated with “E”– the event detail – for the 
moment.) Given the importance of discrepancy detection, Figure 1 distinguishes between 
cases where discrepancy detection was indicated at test and cases where it was not. Figure 1 
shows that if a discrepancy was successfully detected (left-hand side of Figure 1), there was 
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an appropriate task representation which led to low endorsement of misleading details and 
low confidence assigned to the few misleading details that were endorsed (Outcome A). This 
outcome was the same regardless of the type of post-warning and corresponds to the outcome 
for DD items in both warning groups of Experiment 1 and analogous items in both warning 
groups of Experiment 2.16  
In contrast, if a discrepancy detection was not indicated at test (right-hand side of 
Figure 1), the task representation and the ultimate outcome depended on the post-warning 
type. We suspect in a lot of these cases the misleading detail was the only one retrieved, but it 
was retrieved lacking source information. A general post-warning was not effective enough 
for participants to adopt an appropriate task representation and to be cautious about endorsing 
this single detail. As a result, it was fully endorsed with high confidence (Outcome C). This 
outcome corresponds to the results for NDD items in the general-warning group of 
Experiment 1 and analogous items in the same group in Experiment 2.  
On the other hand, if there was no indication of discrepancy detection at test and 
participants were specifically post-warned, participants adopted an appropriate task 
representation and they only endorsed the misleading detail with moderate frequency and 
assigned moderate confidence to it (Outcome B). Endorsement and confidence was tempered 
under these circumstances because, although there may have been a candidate response for 
the question (the misleading detail in many cases), participants were aware that two 
discrepant details were associated with the question, even though they could not explicitly 
identify them. As a result of this more adequate task representation, a continued search may 
have ensued which on some occasions may have been successful, leading to somewhat higher 
                                            
16 Although the cued-recall test in Experiment 2 did not allow us to explicitly identify DD and NDD items (see 
Footnote 11), the procedure in Experiment 2 was the same as Experiment 1 up to the point of testing. 
Consequently, we assume that discrepancy detection occurred during narrative encoding in Experiment 2 at 
approximately the same rate as Experiment 1. 
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memory accuracy compared to NDD items in the general-warning group. However, if the 
search was unsuccessful, participants may have guessed, which would moderate both 
accuracy and confidence. This outcome corresponds to the NDD items in the specific-
warning group of Experiment 1 and analogous items in the same group in Experiment 2.  
More principally, the argument would be that (post-)warnings are only effective to the 
degree that participants’ subjective impression of the potential to make memory errors 
(implied by the post-warning) matches the actual potential to make those errors. Post-warning 
specificity (in our case implemented as item-specific post-warnings) contributes to post-
warning effectiveness by narrowing this subjective-objective gap and informing participants’ 
task representations and ensuing retrieval strategies (e.g., failing to recollect a discrepancy 
after being specifically warned called for continued memory search). We think that exploring 
different aspects of such (mis)matches between subjective and objective memory task 
contexts could be a worthwhile avenue for future research.  
Discrepancy Detection and Event Details 
Although failing to detect discrepancies for misleading items had a disastrous effect 
on accuracy in Experiment 1, particularly if participants were only provided with a general 
warning, substantial benefits were observed if discrepancies were detected. Accuracy on 
misleading DD items in Experiment 1 was near ceiling and exceeded control accuracy by a 
substantial degree (Table 1). In all likelihood, this accuracy advantage was not solely due to 
the fact that memory for event details was good for DD items. Although the control accuracy 
exerted a significant effect in the hierarchical regression analysis, suggesting that item 
selection played a partial role in this facilitative effect, the analysis also pointed to an 
additional unique contribution of discrepancy detection. 
Why would presenting misleading information to participants be associated with such 
excellent performance? As we noted above, Jacoby, Wahlheim and colleagues (e.g., Jacoby 
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et al., 2013, 2015; Putnam et al., 2014; Wahlheim, 2014, 2015) have investigated analogous 
facilitation effects in classical interference paradigms. In the retroactive interference version 
of this paradigm, which is closest to the paradigm used to study misinformation effects, 
participants first study word pairs in an initial list and then study a second list in which the 
stimulus in the pair is presented with a different response (i.e., A-B, A-D). Memory for the 
initial pairing is then tested (A-?, for which the correct response is “B”) and the typical 
finding is that memory is impaired compared to a control condition (A-B, C-D). However, 
Jacoby et al.’s (2015) interesting novel finding was that if participants noticed that the 
response paired with the stimulus had changed between the first and second list (or to use our 
lingo, they detected a discrepancy), and they successfully recollected that change at test, 
recall performance in the interference condition exceeded that in the control condition. For 
example, in their Experiment 1, recall accuracy in the A-B, C-D control condition was 40%. 
However, if the experimental context was conducive to detecting and recollecting change, 
recall accuracy in the A-B, A-D interference condition was significantly higher at 50%.  
Jacoby et al. (2015) interpreted such facilitative effects within a recursive-remindings 
framework (e.g., Hintzman, 2011). A central tenet of this framework is that noticing change 
(i.e., detecting discrepancies) requires that the original, pre-changed stimulus (or stimulus 
pair) be covertly retrieved. Hence, the process of detecting change engenders retrieval 
practice (or a spaced covert repetition) of the original stimulus, which is well-known to 
enhance memory (e.g., Carrier & Pashler, 1992; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006), even if the 
retrieval is covert (e.g., M. A. Smith, Roediger, & Karpicke, 2013). Applying this logic to the 
misinformation paradigm, which is a special case of the retroactive interference paradigm, the 
message is that discrepancy detection does not just serve to limit endorsements of the 
misleading detail, but it can also enhance memory for the original event. This enhancement is 
important because it suggests that, like the classical retroactive interference paradigm with 
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word pairs, there may actually be two effects produced by exposure to misinformation: 
interference if a discrepancy is not detected but facilitation if it is.  
Although the importance of discrepancy detection in limiting vulnerability to 
misinformation has been documented in the past (e.g., Blank, 1998; Higham, 1998; Schooler 
& Loftus, 1986; Tousignant et al., 1986), very little research has focused on the facilitative 
effect on event memory that misinformation can have when it is coupled with discrepancy 
detection during narrative encoding. One exception is Oeberst & Blank (2012) who found a 
memory advantage for event details in the misleading condition in cases where the task 
representation was very clearly specified. They attributed this effect partly to discrepancy 
detection during narrative encoding leading to deeper processing of the event detail (see also 
Blank, 2005, for related effects in a classical interference paradigm). More recently, Putnam 
et al. (2017) conducted two experiments on the misinformation effect using a three-
alternative recognition test consisting of the event detail, the misleading detail, and a new 
detail. Similar to our Experiment 1 results, they found that detecting change led to greater 
endorsement of the event detail, and lower endorsement of the misleading detail, compared to 
control items. These studies, together with our current results, suggest that facilitation of 
event memory due to misinformation may be fairly common but potentially masked in many 
studies by interference effects (i.e., the net effect of misinformation on performance is 
typically negative). However, if performance is made conditional on discrepancy-detection 
decisions (as in Putnam et al. and our Experiment 1) or if an appropriate task representation is 
greatly emphasized (as in Blank, 2005, Oeberst & Blank, 2012, and in the specific-warning 
group of the current Experiment 2), then facilitation will be observed.  
Facilitation due to covert retrieval practice is depicted on the left-hand side of Figure 
1 as “E: enhanced memory due to covert retrieval practice during narrative encoding.” It is 
associated with Outcome A, which requires discrepancy detection. Outcome A corresponds 
GENERAL AND SPECIFIC POST-WARNINGS      39 
 
to the misleading DD questions in both post-warning groups of Experiment 1 (and to 
analogous but not explicitly identified misleading questions in the specific-warning group of 
Experiment 2). In all these cases, retrieval practice of event details led to better-than-control 
performance for the misleading items.  
Another potential facilitative effect of misinformation may have been at work in 
Experiment 2. In that experiment, we observed that cued recall of event details in the 
specific-warning group – but not in the general-warning group – was greater for misleading 
items than control items (see Table 3). As the two warning groups were treated identically 
prior to the memory test, the rate of discrepancy detection during narrative encoding (and 
associated Outcome A; Figure 1) was likely comparable between the two warning groups and 
therefore cannot explain facilitation in one group but not the other.  
It is worth noting at the outset that this enhanced event memory for misleading vs 
control items is completely at odds with the “overwriting” or “destructive updating” 
hypothesis (e.g., Loftus, 1979a, 1979b; Loftus & Loftus, 1980; Loftus et al., 1978). By this 
hypothesis, the original event memory would have been overwritten by the misinformation, 
so there was no way that facilitation due to the receipt of misinformation could have occurred 
instead. Furthermore, even if there was a way of explaining the facilitation, the destructive 
updating hypothesis still leaves unexplained why the facilitation occurred in the specific-, but 
not the general-warning group.  
The question at this juncture is: If it was not discrepancy detection or destructive 
updating that caused the facilitation, then what caused it? We see an important mechanism 
contributing to this facilitative effect on event detail recall in Experiment 2 as extended 
memory search at test specifically for misleading questions in the specific-warning group. In 
the specific-warning group, the adequate task representation conveyed by the specific 
warning motivated participants to continue searching memory for two details if they failed to 
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detect a discrepancy for misleading questions (right-hand side of Figure 1). In contrast, there 
was no need to extend the search if only one detail came to mind for control questions 
because participants were informed that there is only one associated detail. This enhanced 
searching specifically for misleading questions may have sometimes been successful but 
sometimes may have caused retrieval of the misleading detail. However, as we have argued 
above, we suspect the appropriate task representation in the specific-warning group altered 
not just the time and effort devoted to searching memory to answer misleading questions, but 
also enhanced source monitoring (i.e., the knowledge that there were two discrepant details 
invoked more stringent source-monitoring processes). The net result was better event-detail 
recall for misleading questions compared to control questions in the specific-warning group 
of Experiment 2 (i.e., Outcome B in Figure 1). In the general-warning group, by comparison, 
participants likely had a dysfunctional search-and-accept task representation for misleading 
NDD items that undermined the motivation to continue searching memory if a discrepancy 
was not detected and only one detail was retrieved. The net result was lower event-detail 
recall for misleading vs control questions (Outcome C in Figure 1), because the one retrieved 
detail would often have been the misleading detail (e.g., due to recency) and the – potentially 
available – event detail was never retrieved, as the search was not continued. 
Generally, then, the group difference in event detail recall for misleading items 
reflects the differential prevalence of Outcomes B and C. The total level of facilitation (i.e., 
overall misleading minus control performance) observed in the groups (+8% and -2% in the 
specific- and general-warning groups, respectively) reflects a combination of Outcomes A 
and (mostly) B in the specific-warning group and a combination of Outcomes A and (mostly) 
C in the general-warning group (with the contribution of A being constant because of the 
identical procedure up to the point of testing). Hence, the overall misleading facilitation 
effect observed in the specific-warning group of Experiment 2 may reflect both encoding-
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based and retrieval-based facilitation, whereas the absence of overall facilitation in the 
general-warning group likely reflects a mixture of encoding-based facilitation and retrieval-
based interference effects (i.e., misleading detail endorsement) for different items that 
approximately cancelled each other out.  
Beyond demonstrating facilitation effects in the misinformation paradigm, the present 
findings also add to the nascent memory facilitation literature in another respect. Unlike the 
effects found with traditional interference designs and with Putnam et al.’s (2017) 
misinformation paradigm, our facilitation effects occurred without any explicit instructions to 
detect discrepancies prior to narrative encoding (see e.g. Jacoby et al., 2015, for typical 
instructions). Rather, because of the typical consistency assumption in misinformation studies 
(Blank, 1998), participants likely did not expect any change at all (they were only alerted to 
the possibility of change in the post-warning about misinformation). Therefore, any 
change/discrepancy detection occurred spontaneously. It would be interesting to determine in 
future research if spontaneous change detection is more or less facilitative than guided 
change detection. We suspect it may be the former, as spontaneous detection is likely more 
surprising and therefore should lead to more elaboration of the changed elements.  
Conclusion 
 Our research adds to a growing body of research that demonstrates the effectiveness 
of (some) post-warnings against misinformation (Blank & Launay, 2014). It extends previous 
research by focusing on post-warning specificity and examining the processes underlying 
general and item-specific post-warnings. By contrasting these two types of post-warnings, we 
discovered a potential Achilles heel of general post-warnings – their ambiguity in terms of 
the adequate task representation and retrieval strategy for individual test items. General post-
warnings are – paradoxically – not necessarily general, in that they do not convey an 
adequate representation and effective strategy by default, across the board. Rather, their 
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effects seem to materialize locally, when supported by memory for original details and 
previous discrepancy detections. In the absence of such support, general post-warnings may 
be completely ineffective. Thus, the varied success of general post-warnings could be 
partially explained by differences in these associated features and processes.  
The effectiveness of specific post-warnings, in contrast, suggests that due caution 
when answering questions about specific topics or people can potentially overcome the 
negative effects of misinformation. This finding comes as some relief given the prevalence of 
misinformation in the form of “fake news” in today’s “post-truth” society. As we noted in the 
Introduction, specific post-warnings might take the form of questioning the veracity of 
memories pertaining to particular topics or people that may be associated with 
misinformation. An interesting avenue for future research would be to investigate whether 
self-generated specific warnings that are topic- or person-based are as effective as externally 
generated ones such as those used in our current research. 
In a more general perspective, the differential post-warning effects featured in this 
article illustrate the complexity of the interaction between task instructions, stored memory 
information, misinformation, and metacognitive processes. Not too long ago, misinformation 
was believed to have simple, straightforward effects on memory for witnessed event details 
(e.g., memory impairment: Loftus, 1991; response biases: McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). 
The new picture that has emerged more recently highlights, in addition to such influences, a 
variety of processes that intervene between memory retrieval and memory report (see our 
discussion of conversion and metacognitive monitoring and control processes in the 
Introduction to this article). In this new picture, external influences (such as misinformation) 
rarely have a direct, unmediated influence on memory. Rather, they are absorbed, along with 
other relevant information, in a constructive act of remembering. As a result, memory 
performance in the face of misinformation will be sometimes impaired (the typical case), 
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sometimes unaffected, and sometimes, when supported by discrepancy detection, even 
improved. Exploring the intricacies of the interplay between memory, testing conditions and 
task representations along the lines sketched in the present research will help understand this 
variability in outcomes.   
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Table 1 
Mean Accuracy in Experiment 1 as a Function of Question Type and Post-Warning Group. 
Standard Errors Are Shown in Parentheses. 
 Question Type 
 Control  Misleading 
   Group Overall  Overall NDD DD 
General-warning .78 (.03)  .59 (.04) .39 (.05) .90 (.03) 
Specific-warning .75 (.02)  .71 (.04) .58 (.04) .95 (.02) 
Note: The overall mean for misleading questions is based on items for which no discrepancy 
was detected (NDD) and items for which discrepancy was detected (DD).   
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Table 2 
Mean Confidence (%) in Experiment 1 as a Function of Question Type, Accuracy, and Post-
Warning Group. Standard Errors Are Shown in Parentheses. 
 Question Type 
  Control  Misleading 
Group and Accuracy Overall  Overall NDD 
General-warning     
   Correct 79 (2)  80 (2) 69 (3) 
   Incorrect 54 (4)  67 (3) 68 (3) 
Specific-warning     
   Correct 83 (1)  83 (1) 74 (2) 
   Incorrect 68 (3)  65 (3) 64 (2) 
Note: NDD = misleading items for which no discrepancy was detected. Due to occasional 
empty cells, the means and standard errors are based on Ns ranging from 22 to 24. 
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Table 3 
Mean Proportion of Control and Misleading Questions with Critical-Event Details (Correct) 
and Critical-Misleading Details (Incorrect) as Responses in Experiment 2. Standard Errors 
Are Shown in Parentheses. 
 Question Type 
 Detail Type and Group Control Misleading 
Critical-event details (correct)  
   General-warning .40 (.03) .38 (.03) 
   Specific-warning .39 (.03) .47 (.04) 
Critical-misleading details (incorrect)  
   General-warning .08 (.01) .25 (.02) 
   Specific-warning .09 (.01) .13 (.02) 
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Table 4 
Mean Confidence (%) in Experiment 2 as a Function of Question Type, Post-Warning Group, 
and Accuracy. Standard Errors Are Shown in Parentheses. 
 Question Type 
   Accuracy and Group Control Misleading 
General-warning   
   Correct 89 (1) 85 (2) 
   Incorrect 58 (6) 67 (5) 
Specific-warning   
   Correct 87 (3) 87 (2) 
   Incorrect 61 (8) 55 (7) 
Note. The correct and incorrect answers taken into account for this analysis were the recalled 
critical-event and critical-misleading details pertaining to a test question (not any non-critical 
correct or non-critical incorrect answers). Due to occasional empty cells, the means and 
standard errors are based on Ns ranging from 17 to 22.  
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Figure 1. Flowchart of the underlying processes for misleading items leading to three 
potential outcomes in Experiments 1 and 2. In both experiments, discrepancy detection leads 
to fundamentally different results compared to no discrepancy detection. If a discrepancy is 
detected, regardless of whether participants are provided with a specific or general warning, 
misleading details (M) are associated with low endorsement and low confidence. Also, 
detecting discrepancies causes covert retrieval practice and enhanced memory of the event 
detail (E) (Outcome A). The net result is high endorsement of E and low endorsement of M. 
If no discrepancy is detected and there is a general post-warning, M is frequently endorsed 
with high confidence whereas there is no enhanced memory due to covert retrieval practice of 
E during narrative encoding (Outcome C). The net result is high endorsement of M and low 
endorsement of E. However, if discrepancy detection fails but participants are specifically 
warned, although there is no enhanced memory of E due to covert retrieval during narrative 
encoding, memory for E may be enhanced because participants conduct a more thorough 
search of memory at test. This thorough memory search may lead to greater retrieval of E 
relative to a general warning where the search may be aborted prior to retrieval of E 
(Outcome B). The net result is moderate endorsement of both E and M. 
